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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY - JUDICIAL ADOPTION
OF PURE COMPARATIVE APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY -
In Products Liability Actions Based Other Than Upon Negli-
gence, a Defendant May Obtain a Jury Allocation of the
Plaintiff's Damages According to the Plaintiff's, Defendants',
and Third Parties' Respective Percentages of Causation of
Those Damages. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414
(Tex. 1984).
On October 19, 1976, Benjamin Smithson, an instructor
pilot for Air Plains West, Inc.,' was giving James Parker fly-
ing lessons2 over eastern New Mexico.' Three miles south-
west of Tepico, New Mexico, the Cessna 150 containing
Smithson and Parker crashed into the ground at a speed of
less than 60 miles per hour. aThe force upon impact caused
the legs of the Cessna aircraft's seats to break and threw
Smithson and Parker against the forward part of the cockpit.5
As a result of the crash, both men were killed.6
Carolyn Parker Duncan and her minor children filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas against Air Plains West, Inc., alleging that the negli-
gence of Smithson and his employer, Air Plains West, Inc.,
proximately caused the death of James Parker. 7 In settle-
ment for $90,000, Mrs. Duncan and the children released
from liability Air Plains West, Inc., Smithson's estate, and
"any other corporations or persons whomsoever responsible
therefor . . .
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 632 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982),
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Mrs. Duncan then filed a wrongful death action against
Cessna Aircraft Company9 in the Travis County District
Court, alleging that the seats of the airplane, one of which
was occupied by Parker at the time of the crash, were defec-
tively designed or manufactured by Cessna.' ° Duncan fur-
ther alleged that the defective seats failed in the crash,
causing the death of Parker.' Cessna denied the defective-
ness of the aircraft seats 2 and alleged that the settlement
agreement and release executed by Duncan barred any claim
by Duncan against Cessna.13 Cessna counterclaimed that
Smithson's negligence caused the crash and that it would be
entitled to contribution from Smithson's estate for any dam-
ages required of it by virtue of Duncan's suit. 4 The jury
found that the seats of the aircraft were defective in design
and manufacture 5 and set damages for the death of Parker
at one million dollars.' 6 Upon motion for judgment non ob-
stante veredto'7 by Cessna on grounds that it was absolved of
liability by the previously executed settlement and release of
Air Plains West, Inc. and Smithson's estate, the court ren-
dered a take nothing judgment against Mrs. Duncan.' 8
On appeal, the Austin Court of Appeals reversed the judg-
ment of the trial court and remanded for a partial new trial.'9
The court, in stating an inability simply to render a judg-
ment for Mrs. Duncan, 20 remanded the case so that Cessna
might attempt to prove a right of contribution against Smith-








17 Judgment non obstante veredcto is judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict.
Duncan, 632 S.W.2d at 378. Judgment non obstante veredcto was granted by the
court following its favorable ruling upon Cessna's motion that New Mexico law ap-
plied to the extent that it differed from that of Texas. Id.
Duncan, 632 S.W.2d at 390.
' d.
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proven, the trial court should render judgment for Mrs.
Duncan and against Cessna for $500,000.22 The decision of
the Court of Appeals was appealed to the Supreme Court of
Texas on a writ of error.2 3 Held, reversed and rendered in prod-
ucts liability actions based other than upon negligence, a de-
fendant may obtain a jury allocation of the plaintiff's
damages according to the plaintiff's, defendants', and third
parties' respective percentages of causation of those damages.
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
I. BACKGROUND: STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Cause of Action
Until 1967, a Texas consumer's only avenue of redress for
damages or injuries caused by a "defective" product was a
derivative action under breach of warranty24 or under ordi-
nary negligence principles as to the conduct of the manufac-
turer.25 But in 1967 the Supreme Court of Texas adopted
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts2 6 as the law
12 Id.
-1 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 199 (1983).
21 The breach of warranty (express and implied) cause of action still exists under the
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.313 - 2.318 (Vernon 1968). See, e.g., Garcia v.
Texas Instruments Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980); Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v.
Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
See Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
' McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (stating that strict
liability under section 402A "should be held applicable to defective products which
cause physical harm to persons"). Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416
S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967) (holding section 402A applicable to a case involving the explo-
sion of contaminated kerosene which was characterized as unreasonably dangerous).
Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liabil-
ity for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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on strict products liability in Texas for a number of substan-
tial policy reasons.2 7 Under Section 402A, to establish a strict
products liability cause of action against a manufacturer, dis-
tributor, or retailer, the plaintiff must show, first, that the de-
fendant, as a "seller" of the product,28 introduced it into the
In Texas, prior to the McKisson and Tunks decisions, strict liabilty in tort applied
only to contaminated foods. See, e.g., Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex.
609, 622, 164 S.W.2d 828, 834 (1942) (establishing strict liability in cases of contami-
nated foods, the court stated that "the defendant, as the manufacturer and vendor of
the [food] in question [is] liable to the plaintiffs, as consumers thereof, for the injuries
caused to them [by reason of contamination], even though the defendant was not negli-
gent in the processing thereof"). It should be noted that a section 402A cause of action
supplements but does not supplant either the breach of warranty or negligence causes
of action as alternative theories of recovery. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § § 75-81, at 492-540 (4th ed. 1971); Wade,
Products Liability and Plaitnf's Fault - The Unform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L.
REV. 373 (1978).
21 See Tunks, 416 S.W.2d at 782-83; McKi-son, 416 S.W.2d at 788-89. The adoption
of strict products liability is the result of a number of public policy considerations.
James B. Sales explains that
[a]doption of the doctrine of strict tort liability was designed to alleviate
the more difficult burden of proof required for a claimant to establish a
cause of action based on the traditional common law negligence doc-
trine. The rationale undergirding section 402A is multifaceted. In some
jurisdictions adoption of the doctrine has been predicated on the deep
pocket theory; that is, the product supplier, as part of an enterprise lia-
bility, is better able to absorb the cost of injuries than the consumer by a
proportionate distribution of these costs to the purchasing public. Other
jurisdictions rely on the theory implicit in the Restatement that the
product supplier impliedly represents that the products introduced into
the stream of commerce are safe for use. Some proponents of the doc-
trine disingenuously declare that the supplier is motivated to introduce
only safe products into the stream of commerce by the ominous presence
of strict tort liability. Irrespective of the rationale relied upon, section
402A has interjected a relatively novel concept of liability into the tort
reparations systems. Although liability is judicially emphasized not to
be absolute, the minimization of the degree of proof required by a claim-
ant to establish a cause of action under the doctrine, coupled with con-
straints imposed on the product supplier's defenses, has effectuated a
distinctly consumer oriented cause of action.
Sales, Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort Liabiity-Prelude to Comparative Fault,
11 TEx. TECH L. REV. 729, 730-31 (1980). See also W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY § 2 at 13 (1979).
21 A plaintiff may bring suit against anyone who manufactures, distributes, or sells a
defective product. See Lubbock Manufacturing Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
584 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding chain of man-
ufacturers liable in trucking accident); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d
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stream of commerce;29 second, that the plaintiff was a "con-
sumer" of the product; 3° third, that the product was unrea-
sonably dangerous due to a defect 3' and that the defect
existed at the time the product left the control of the defend-
ant, not having undergone any significant alterations;
32
787 (Tex. 1967) (holding distributor liable for defectively manufactured hair wave
product).
-9 The introduction of a product into the "stream of commerce," although loosely
defined in the case law of strict products liability, includes the following transactions:
selling the product, see, e.g., Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164
S.W.2d 828 (1942) (pre-section 402A case finding the manufacturer liable for the sale
of adulterated sausage as introducing product into stream of commerce); Griggs Can-
ning Co. v. Josey, 239 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942) (holding retailer of defective
canned spinach liable under strict liability as introduced into stream of commerce);
leasing the product, see, e.g., Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975) (holding
lease of defective scaffolding as introducing it into the stream of commerce); and gratu-
itously giving away the product, see, e.g., McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d
787 (Tex. 1967) (ruling that the giving away of a product with the expectation of
potential future sales was an introduction into the stream of commerce).
The stream of commerce concept has limits, however. As stated by the court in
Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez, 570 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. 1978), "[t]he product must
be released in some manner to the consuming public." Id. One limit is that products
introduced to individuals for the purpose of industrial testing, as in Urquidez where a
truck tire was used for testing purposes by an employee hired to test tires, have been
held not to have entered the stream of commerce. Id
In addition, the court in Harvillev. Anchor- Wate Co., 663 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1981) held
that a machine not yet complete in its manufacture or testing had not entered the
stream of commerce for purposes of strict products liability. Id.
:1 See Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capp, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (Tex.
1942) (holding plaintiff as a "consumer" of adulterated sausage when he purchased
and served it); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1967) (holding
plaintiff as a "consumer" of an unreasonably dangerous hair wave product by ac-
cepting and using it).
m As stated by the court in Tumerv. GeneralMotors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979),
"the concept of defect is central to a products liability action brought on a strict liabil-
ity theory, whether the defect be in conscious design or in the manufacture of the
product, or in the marketing of the product." Id. For a detailed analysis of the concept
of defectiveness, see Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J.
30 (1973). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, supra note 26.
:12 For an explanation of the relationship of the "alteration" or "misuse" of a product
after it has left the control of the distributor to the "defectiveness" of same, see General
Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). The Hopkins court explained:
[T]here are a variety of points upon which the unintended or reasonably
unforeseeable use or alteration of a product may be relevant to the liabil-
ity of the supplier of the product. The misuse may bear upon the issue
[under section 402A] of whether the product was defective when it left
the hands of the supplier or the misuse may bear on the issue of what
caused the harm.
Id. at 349. See infra notes 44-55 for discussion of the alteration/misuse defense.
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fourth, that the damaging event was the result of a foresee-
able use;33 and finally, that the defect was a producing cause
of the plaintiff's injuries. 4
B. Defenses
The Texas courts have reluctantly approved the limited
defenses to strict products liability of voluntary unreasonable
assumption of risk and unforeseeable product misuse.35 Al-
though it rejected pure contributory negligence as a defense,
the Texas Supreme Court held in Henderson v. Ford Motor Co.36
that "the form of contributory negligence which consists in
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a
known, danger. . . is a defense. . . .- In Henderson, a piece
of rubber gasket from the air filter housing of Mrs. Hender-
son's 1968 Lincoln Continental automobile jammed the car-
buretor in an open position at the moment the plaintiff
accelerated to enter a freeway. 38 After leaving the freeway,
and unable to slow the vehicle, Mrs. Henderson drove her car
into a signal light pole in an attempt to avoid injuring third
parties. 9 The plaintiff was seriously injured and sued the
Ford Motor Company, maker of the automobile. ° Mrs.
Henderson obtained judgment at trial, but the judgment was
reversed and remanded by the Court of Appeals on the basis
x, See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 ('rex. 1977). See also discus-
sion of misuse defense, infra text accompanying notes 44-55.
:11 See Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1976). "Producing cause" has been
defined in approved jury instructions as "an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause,
which, in a natural sequence, produced injuries or damages complained of, if any.
There can be more than one producing cause." Id at 798. See also C.A. Hoover and
Son v. O.M. Franklin Serum Co., 444 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1969).
x- See generally FRUMER & FREIDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A [5][f (1983) (sec-
tions of a general treatise on products liability which deal with defenses); Sales, supra
note 27 (examination of the development of assumption of risk and misuse defenses in
strict products liability); Noel, Defective Products. Abnormal Use, Contributory Neghgence, and
Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1972) (an early examination of defenses to a
section 402A cause of action).
519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
Id. at 90 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment n
(1965)).
:' 519 S.W.2d at 88-89.
'" Id at 88.
,oId.
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of her alleged assumption of the risk of driving her car into
the light pole.41 The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that the
defense of assumption of risk remained as it had at common
law - absolute.4 2 The Henderson court, quoting the Restate-
ment, stated that "[i]f the user or consumer discovers the de-
fect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds
unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it,
he is barred from recoverY.' '
Further, in 1977 the defense of unforeseeable product mis-
use was adopted by the court in General Motors Corp. v. Hop-
kb'ns.4 In Hopkins, the plaintiff was badly hurt when he lost
control of the speed of his pick-up truck after the carburetor
locked in an open position, and the truck capsized. 5 The
plaintiff brought suit against General Motors Corporation.46
In turn, General Motors asserted the defense of misuse, alleg-
ing that Hopkins had altered the carburetor.47 Although the
jury returned findings that Hopkins had "misused" the car-
buretor and that such misuse was a producing cause of his
accident, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff.48
The Houston Court of Civil Appeals and the Supreme Court
of Texas affirmed.4 9 In relieving the manufacturer of liability
for injuries which are the result of unintended and unforesee-
able uses or alterations of the product,5" the Supreme Court
of Texas held that a manufacturer should not be held liable
11 Id See Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 500 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beau-
mont 1973).
,2 Henderson, 519 S.W.2d at 90.
4:' Id (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment n (1965))
(emphasis added).
4 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).




Id. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 535 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. -
Houston [ist Dist.] 1976).
- Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 349-52. As explained by Sales, supra note 27, at 753, the
"misuse" in Hopkins, which consisted of the removal and replacement of the truck's
carburetor, actually amounted to an alteration. Section 402A provides an exclusion
from a prima facie case of strict products liability when the product has undergone any
significant alteration. Id at 753. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A
(1965).
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for "a use or handling so unusual that the average consumer
could not reasonably expect the product to be designed and
manufactured to withstand it - a use which the seller, there-
fore, need not anticipate and provide for."'"
In Hopkins the court reasoned that
product liability was never intended to take the place of insur-
ance, and we see no justification for making the supplier reim-
burse the plaintiff for that portion of his own damages as he
caused by a use of the product which the supplier would not
have foreseen - and which use the plaintiff should have fore-
seen would create or increase the attendant danger. Reduc-
tion of the plaintiffs recovery should be ordered where the
misuse is a concurring proximate cause of the damaging
event.52
Thus, under Hopkins a proportionate reduction in damages
was pronounced as available when the "harm [was] reason-
ably foreseeable to the user . . . . The Supreme Court of
Texas thereby established that where both a product defect
and user misconduct combine to proximately cause the dam-
aging event, the plaintiff's recovery is limited to that portion
of his damages caused by the product defect; 54 the manufac-
turer's liability is thereby mitigated.55
C. Indemnity and Contribution
Historically, however, the court's greatest means of adjust-
ing the liabilities among tortfeasors has been through the
grant of indemnity or contribution.56 Indemnity mandates
r-, Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 349 (quoting the reasoning of the Oregon Supreme Court
in Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Or. 300, -, 508 P.2d 28, 31 (1973)).
'2 Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 351.
.:, Id. at 352.
rl Id The "comparison" as set forth in Hopkins was specifically excluded from the
Texas comparative negligence scheme under TEX. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a
(Vernon Supp. 1983). Instead of barring recovery where the plaintiff was found to
have "caused" a greater proportion of the damaging event, the plaintiff may recover in
all cases where the product defect was found to be a cause. Id
548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
See generaly Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEX. L. REV.
150 (1947). See also Sales, Contribution and Indemnity Between Negligent and Strictly Liable
Tortfeasors, 12 ST. MARY'S L. J. 323 (1980).
1984] CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES 1029
the shift of a tort loss from one party to another;57 that is, the
right of a party to indemnity entitles him to shift the entire
burden of responsibility to another who is legally responsible
for the loss.58 In contrast, contribution may be characterized
as "the payment by each tortfeasor of his proportionate share
of the plaintiffs damages to any other tortfeasor who has
paid more than his proportionate part." 59
At common law, the right of indemnity arose in three types
of negligence or strict liability cases: 60 those where the de-
fendants were not zn par" dehcto,61 those where the party seek-
ing indemnity was vicariously liable by operation of law,62
r-1 See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1977) (giving a
general history of indemnity); Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1962) (holding
that entitlement to indemnification is dependent upon the nature of the case); Renfro
Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950) (enunciating a breach of duty
test for indemnity); Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 153 S.W.2d 449 (1941) (holding
that different qualities of negligence are required for right of indemnity).
- See B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, and Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc.,
603 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. 1980) (explicating a doctrine of indemnity in the context of
the application of article 2212a).
r" General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1977)
(crashworthiness case analyzing the history of indemnity and contribution). See gener-
ally Hodges, supra note 56.
"' See Hodges, supra note 56; Sales, supra note 56.
As the court explained in Wheelerv. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, -, 153 S.W.2d 449, 451
(1941), when "the parties [were] shown not to have been equally guilty [or, not in pari
deh'clo], the principal delinquent may [have been] held responsible to a co-delinquent
for damage paid by reason of the offense in which both were concerned in different
degrees as perpetrators." Id (citing 10 TEx. JUR. § 554 (1937)).
Thus, as between co-tortfeasors, if one owed a markedly higher degree of care to the
plaintiff or other parties than another, a successful action for indemnity could have
been maintained by the less culpable tortfeasor. See Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d
787 (Tex. 1962); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950);
Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 153 S.W.2d 449 (1941).
62 Appearing most often in the master-servant context, vicarious liability works to
make the master constructively liable for the acts of the servant. See South Austin
Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
The court in San Antonio v. Smith, 94 Tex. 266, 59 S.W. 1109 (1900), explained that
[i]t is well settled that under some states of fact two parties may be liable
to another for a tort, - the one by construction of law, on account of
some omission of a duty of protection or care owed; and the other be-
cause he is the active perpetrator of the wrong, - and that in such cases
the right of indemnity may exist in the one whose wrong was only a
secondary one.
Id at 1111.
Such a right of indemnity - still available to some extent-may not exist, however,
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and those where one tortfeasor had breached a duty he owed
to the party seeking indemnity.63 The Supreme Court of
Texas, however, removed most common law bases of indem-
nity among negligent tortfeasors in its 1980 decision in B &B
Auto Supply, Sand Pit, and Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines.6 4
In B & B Auto Supply, the plaintiff brought suit against a
trucking company and a clay pit operator for damages sus-
tained when a truck owned by Central Freight Lines jack-
knifed and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle.65 The clay pit
operator's liability was alleged because Central's truck skid-
ded on dirt and debris left on the roadway by trucks loaded
by the clay pit operator.66 At trial the jury found that both
B & B and Central were negligent and that such negligence
proximately caused the collision. 67 The trial court rendered
judgment upon the jury findings but granted Central com-
plete indemnity against B & B because B & B had breached a
duty it owed Central by leaving hazardous debris on the
roadway. 68  The court of appeals affirmed.69 The Supreme
Court of Texas, in continuing its trend of erasing "all-or-
nothing" doctrines from Texas law,7 ° barred indemnity
if the master is also liable for independent acts of negligence, such as negligent entrust-
ment or negligent hiring. See Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ.
App. - Tyler 1979, writ ref1d n.r.e.); Hines v. Nelson, 547 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ. App.
- Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
lo At common law, a right of indemnity arose when "one of the tortfeasors had
breached a duty he owed both to his co-tortfeasor and to the injured third person."
Austin Road Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 435, 216 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1949). Envisioned
by Texas courts as an imaginary lawsuit, the breach of duty test for indemnity deter-
mined the shift of a loss by "consider[ing] the one seeking indemnity as though he were
a plaintiff suing the other in tort, and then determin[ing] whether such a one as [the]
plaintiff, though guilty of a wrong against a third person, is nevertheless entitled to
recover against his co-tortfeasor." Id
64 603 S.W.2d 814, 815-16 (Tex. 1980).
65 Id
-' Id
67 Id. at 816.
' Id at 815-16. See note 63.
B & B Auto Supply, 603 S.W.2d at 815-16. See Central Freight Lines v. Pride, 588
S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1979).
"I Among the all-or-nothing doctrines that the court had abolished were: the no duty
rule in Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978); the rule ofimminent
perilin Davila v. Sanders, 557 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1977); and the rule ofassumptton of the
nsk in Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975).
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among negligent tortfeasors except in cases of purely vicari-
ous liability or explicit contractual indemnity.7' Relying
upon article 2212a,72 the court stated that "[u]nder art[icle]
2212a, there is no longer any basis for requiring one tortfeasor
" B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, and Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc.,
603 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex. 1980). The court stated that it expressed no opinion as to
whether its holding would extend to causes of action involving a mixture of negligent
and strictly liable tortfeasors. Id.
' Id. See TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1983):
Section 2. (a) In this section:
(1) "Claimant" means any party seeking relief, whether he is a plaintiff,
counterclaimant, or cross-claimant.
(2) "Defendant" includes any party from whom a claimant seeks relief.
(b) In a case in which there is more than one defendant, and the claim-
ant's negligence does not exceed the total negligence of all defendants,
contribution to the damages awarded to the claimant shall be in propor-
tion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each defendant.
(c) Each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of
the judgment awarded the claimant, except that a defendant whose neg-
ligence is less than that of the claimant is liable to the claimant only for
that portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of negli-
gence attributable to him.
(d) If an alleged joint tort-feasor pays an amount to a claimant in settle-
ment, but is never joined as a party defendant, or having been joined, is
dismissed or nonsuited after settlement with the claimant (for which rea-
son the existence and amount of his negligence are not submitted to the
jury), each defendant is entitled to deduct from the amount for which he
is liable to the claimant a percentage of the amount of the settlement
based on the relationship the defendant's own negligence bears to the
total negligence of all defendants.
(e) If an alleged joint tort-feasor makes a settlement with a claimant but
nevertheless is joined as a party defendant at the time of the submission
of the case to the jury (so that the existence and amount of his negligence
are submitted to the jury) and his percentage of negligence is found by
the jury, the settlement is a complete release of the portion of the judg-
ment attributable to the percentage of negligence found on the part of
that joint tort-feasor.
(f) If the application of the rules contained in Subsections (a) through (e)
of this section results in two claimants being liable to each other in dam-
ages, the claimant who is liable for the greater amount is entitled to a
credit toward his liability in the amount of damages owed him by the
other claimant.
(g) All claims for contribution between named defendants in the pri-
mary suit shall be determined in the primary suit, except that a named
defendant may proceed against a person not a party to the primary suit
who has not effected a settlement with the claimant.
(h) This section prevails over Article 2212, Revised Civil Statutes of
Texas, 1925, and all other laws to the extent of any conflict.
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to indemnify another tortfeasor when both have been found
negligent and assessed a percentage of fault by the jury."73
In causes of action involving both strict liability and negli-
gence, however, the court's posture on indemnity has shifted
away from that of the pure negligence case.14  Presently,
when a retailer attempts to obtain indemnity from a strictly
liable manufacturer, his ability to recover rests upon the
proof that he neither knew nor should have known of the de-
fect or that the defect was not reasonably apparent.75 In ad-
dition, the party seeking indemnity must not have been
culpable of negligence which would of itself have caused the
harm.76
The law of contribution in Texas, unlike that of indemnity,
has its roots not in the common law but in statute.77 To ad-
dress contribution among negligent tortfeasors, the Texas leg-
islature enacted article 2212a,7 8 a codification of "modified"
comparative negligence,79 which mandates contribution from
' B & BAuto Supply, 603 S.W.2d at 817.
See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977). See also
Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); Bell Helicopter Co.
v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App. -Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
n, Simmons, 558 S.W.2d at 861 (citing Essex Wire Corp. v. Salt River Project, 9 Ariz.
App. 295, 451 P.2d 653 (1969); Allied Mutual Casualty Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 279 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1960)).
- Simmons, 558 S.W.2d at 861 (citing Essex Wire Corp., 451 P.2d 653; Schuster v.
Steedley, 406 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1966); Kenyon v. F.M.C. Corp., 286 Minn. 183, 176
N.W.2d 69 (1970)). The ability to recover against the manufacturer exists despite the
ordinary exclusion of the right of indemnity for purely economic loss, as liability in tort
may be characterized. Id. at 860-61.
Still, although the courts have been reluctant to grant indemnity for purely eco-
nomic loss, reasoning that such indemnity amounted to "absolute liability," they have
granted indemnity against the manufacturer in cases where the user or third party was
negligent, as long as that negligence was not an independent cause of the harm, and
the defect was not reasonably apparent. See Air Shields, Inc. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d 574
(Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916
(Tex Civ. App. - Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
" See TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1983), supra note 72.
7'1 Id
11 "Modified" comparative negligence in Texas under article 2212a mandates that a
plaintiff who is more negligent than the defendant or defendants combined (i.e. where
the plaintiff is greater than 50% at fault) may not recover any damages; "pure" com-
parative negligence allows the plaintiff to recover his damages in proportion to fault
without regard to the respective percentages of negligence among plaintiffs and
defendants.
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each defendant according to the percentage of fault attribu-
table to him.8" Article 2212a, in addition to apportioning lia-
bility among defendants, also takes into consideration the
plaintiff's proportionate share of contributory negligence as
determined by the jury;8 ' the plaintiff recovers damages from
the defendant as long as his portion of negligence is fifty per-
cent or less of the total negligence.82 Under article 2212a
each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entire
amount of the judgment unless an individual defendant's
negligence is less than that of the plaintiff, in which case that
defendant is liable only for the portion of negligence attribu-
table to him.83
Conversely, because the basis of liability in a cause of ac-
tion in strict liability under section 402A dismisses as immate-
rial any negligence on the part of the distributor,84 the law of
contribution in such cases has evolved to emphasize the pub-
lic policy concerns of strict liability85 and has remained sub-
stantially unresponsive to the issues of fair apportionment of
liability addressed by article 2212a in negligence causes of ac-
tion.86 Consequently, Texas courts have treated contribution
in strict liability and mixed-strict liability/negligence causes
of action under article 221287 rather than under article
11 See Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Smith Material Corp., 616 F.2d 111, 113 (5th
Cir. 1980) (interpreting Texas law as mandating contribution); Deal v. Madison, 576
S.W.2d 409, 416-17 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (elucidating the
rationale behind article 2212a).
a, See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1983).
"1 See art. 2212a §2(b), supra note 72.
: See art. 2212a, §2(c), supra note 72.
' See supra note 26.
fr See supra note 27.
Ii See New Terminal Warehouse Corp. v. Wilson, 589 S.W.2d 465 (Tex Civ. App. -
Houston [14th Dist.] 1979), afd, 605 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1980); Deal v. Madison, 576
S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.- Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See genera/ly, Dorsaneo &
Robertson, Comparative Neghgence in Texas, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 933 (1979).
'1 See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971), which provides:
Any person against whom, with one or more others, a judgment is ren-
dered in any suit on an action arising out of, or based on tort, except in
causes wherein the right of contribution or of indemnity, or of recovery,
over, by and between the defendants is given by statute or exists under
the common law, shall, upon payment of said judgment, have a right of
action against his co-defendant or co-defendants and may recover from
each a sum equal to the proportion of all of the defendants named in
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2212a."8 Indeed, because article 2212a is couched in terms of
negligence,89 and article 2212 is applicable to "torts,''90 the
court in GeneralMotors Corp. v. Smmons9" refused to extend ar-
ticle 2212a to actions in strict liability.92 In Simmons, the
plaintiff sued alleging that in his collision with a third party,
defective glass installed by General Motors had exploded
causing permanent eye damage.93 At the time of trial the
plaintiff had already settled with the third party.94 The jury
returned a verdict for Simmons and against General Motors
for one million dollars, and the trial court rendered judgment
in this amount.95 The court of civil appeals reformed the
judgment against General Motors by granting contribution
from the third party and rendered judgment to reflect the
settlement for $500,000.96 In agreeing with the court of civil
appeals, the Supreme Court of Texas ruled that the third
said judgment. If any of said person co-defendant be insolvent, then
recovery may be had in proportion as each defendant or defendants are
not insolvent; and the right of recovery over against such insolvent de-
fendant or defendants in judgment shall exist in favor of each defendant
in judgment in proportion as he has been caused to pay by reason of
such insolvency.
Id
" TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1983), supra note 72.
See article 2212a, supra note 72.
See article 2212, supra note 87.
91 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
Id. at 862 (Tex. 1977). The court stated:
Article 2212a, which is not here applicable, apportions the damages
among the several torfeasors upon principles of comparative negligence.
The article deals specifically with negligence, and it nowhere uses the
other term "strict liability." See subsection 2(b), (c), (d), and (e), Art.
2212a. Article 2212, on the other hand, speaks out not about negligence,
but about torts. Strict liability is a tort. As stated in Comment "n" of
section 402A, "the basis of liability is purely one of tort." It follows,
therefore, that this case is governed by article 2212 and is still controlled
by Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964), even
though the comparative negligence statute, Article 2212a, has pre-
empted the allocation of liability among negligent tortfeasors controlled
by that statute.
Id
Simmons, 558 S.W.2d at 588.
" d.
91, Id
" Id See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 545 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston
[lst Dist] 1976).
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party should contribute pro rata in mixed-strict liabil-
ity/negligence causes of action, and noted that "[article
2212a] does not provide any mechanism for comparing the
causative fault or percentage causation of a strictly liable
manufacturer with the negligent conduct of a negligent co-
defendant." 97 In dissatisfaction, the court called for legisla-
tive action to alleviate the tensions resulting from the inappli-
cability of article 2212a to strict liability causes of action.98
The Supreme Court of Texas has not been completely un-
willing to move toward comparison of liability in strict prod-
ucts liability cases. 99 In General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins,'00 the
court applied "pure" comparative causation'0 ' when the de-
fendant demonstrated the plaintiffs unforeseeable misuse of
the product.10 2  The court held that if a manufacturer is
strictly liable, but the plaintiff has misused the product, then
comparative causation should apply.'0 3 The court in Hlopkins
established recovery by a plaintiff even if the percentage of
11 Simmons, 558 S.W.2d at 862. See also Bell Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d
519 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Simmons, 558 S.W.2d at 863.
See Hopkzns, 548 S.W.2d 344.
548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
Id. at 351. The court stated that
[a]s indicated . . . contentions by the supplier relative to unforeseeable
misuse of the product by the consumer usually bear upon the primary
issues of defect and/or cause-in-fact of the damaging event. Where the
supplier is unsuccessful in the contentions on those issues, he may inter-
pose an affirmative defense and attempt to prove that the consumer
plaintiff altered or misused the product in an unforeseen manner, that
the misuse was a proximate cause of the damaging event, and that the
misuse contributed to the cause of the event by a certin percent or frac-
tion of the total contribution as between the product defect and the
misuse.
Id
Id at 352. See supra text accompanying notes 44-55.
548 S.W.2d at 352. The court stated:
If the product is found to have been unreasonably dangerous when the
defendant placed it in the stream of commerce, and if that defect is
found to have been a producing cause of the damaging event, and if the
plaintiff has misused the product. . . , and if that misuse is a proximate
cause of the damaging event, the trier of fact must then determine the
respective percentages (totalling 100%) by which these two concurring
causes contributed to bring about the event.
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fault assigned to the misuse was greater than that assigned to
the product's defect." 4 Thus, the actions of the court served
to mitigate the harshness of the previously all-or-nothing mis-
use defense, 0 5 yet to allow the distributor to escape full
liabilty when the plaintiff is partly at fault.0 6
D. National Trends
Concurrently with the Texas development toward a more
responsive system of contribution,0°7 a number of states have
developed systems of comparative responsibility in strict lia-
bility causes of action. Each judicial application of compari-
son in some way addresses the conceptual "apples and
oranges" of fault principles in strict liability.'0 8 As explored
1o That is, the court established "pure" comparison of causation as opposed to arti-
cle 2212a's "modified" comparison of negligence. See supra note 79.
M"1, See supra text accompanying notes 44-55.
IN; Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 352.
,01 See supra text accompanying notes 77-106.
I' Inherent in any judicial adoption of comparative allocation of loss in strict prod-
ucts liability actions is the conceptual and semantic incompatibility of strict liability
without fault and fault-based comparisons. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149,
158 (3d Cir. 1979). See also Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983) (en
banc); Pan-Alaska Fisheries v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1139;
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42, 47 (Rabinowitz, J., con-
curring); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978). The court in Murray posed the proper question as to the application of
fault principles to strict liability actions, stating:
Comparative fault would seem to function smoothly in those negligence
cases in which the defendant is at fault for violating a duty of care owed
to the plaintiff by exposing him to an unreasonable risk of harm and the
plaintiff is at fault for enhancing the danger by exposing himself to an
unreasonable risk of harm. The jury is simply asked to compare the con-
duct of the parties. But in strict products liability actions, where the
focus is on the product defect and not on the defendant's personal mis-
conduct, can comparative fault principles be applied effectively?
610 F.2d at 158. Cf Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). Indeed, the primary difficulty arises when the concept to be
compared is defined as "fault" and the attempt is made by a court to apply the term
"fault" to the comparative apportionment phase of the jury charge. See Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 507, 515 n.9 (1983). While in tort theory the
term "fault" may have no connotations of moral blameworthiness, it is inevitable that
the popular usage connotations of fault, complete with notions of blameworthiness,
would enter improperly into the jury's consideration of fact. See Murray, 610 F.2d at
158-59 (where the court quoted PROSSER, supra note 26, at 493, stating:
There is a broader sense in which "fault" means nothing more than a
departure from a standard of conduct required of a man by society for
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the protection of his neighbors; and if the departure is an innocent one,
and the defendant cannot help it, it is nonetheless a departure, and a
social wrong.
Id). Such considerations of fault give rise to a propensity on the part of the jury to
consider the conduct of the manufacturer and to take its focus off of the product itself.
See Murray, 610 F.2d at 158-59. With a defective product, the substitution of fault for
defect in a strict liability action draws the jury's product focus parallel to the conduct
of the plaintiff and other parties. The court in Murray, 610 F.2d at 158-59, stated in
quoting Aaron Twerski that "[iun this imperfect world it is not an outrageous inference
that a bad defect most probably stems from serious fault-even if the fault need not
nor cannot be established." See Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Re-
thinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297, 331 (1977). Further, the
Murray court stated that
[t]he substitution of the term fault for defect, however, would not appear
to aid the trier of fact in apportioning damages between the defect and
the conduct of the plaintiff. The key conceptual distinction between
strict products liability theory and negligence is that the plaintiff need
not prove faulty conduct on the part of the defendant in order to recover.
The jury is not asked to determine if the defendant deviated from a stan-
dard of care in producing his product. There is no proven faulty con-
duct of the defendant to compare with the faulty conduct of the plaintiff
in order to apportion the responsibility for an accident. Although we
may term a defective product "faulty," it is qualitatively different from
the plaintiff's conduct that contributes to his injury. A comparison of
the two is therefore inappropriate. The characterization of both plain-
tiff's negligent conduct and the defect as faulty may provide a semantic
bridge between negligence and strict liability theories, but it provides
neither a conceptual nor pragmatic basis for apportioning the loss for a
particular injury.
610 F.2d at 159.
By adopting section 402A, the Texas Supreme Court intended that the focus of at-
tention be shifted fom the conduct of the manufacturer to the quality of the product.
See McKisson, 416 S.W.2d 787; and Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779. Still, notions of fault are, in
some sense, inherent in the defective product. See Wade, supra note 26, at 377 (where
Wade stated that
[i]n the case of products liability, the fault inheres primarily in the na-
ture of the product. The product is "bad" because it is not duly safe; it is
determined to be defective and (in most jurisdictions) unreasonably dan-
gerous . . . .It is not necessary to prove negligence in letting the thing
get in the dangerous condition or in failing to discover and rectify it.
Instead, simply maintaining the bad condition or placing the bad prod-
uct on the market is enough for liability . . . .This is legal fault ....
Id). But this argument minimizes "[tlhe key conceptual distinction between strict
products liability theory and negligence[,] in that the plaintiff need not prove faulty
conduct on the part of the defendant to recover." Murray, 610 F.2d at 159. To ask ajury
to compare and quantify the negligent or faulty conduct of a plaintiff with the "bad-
ness" of a product in which no faulty conduct has been proven on the part of the
defendant is to invite jury confusion and inconsistent verdicts. Id
Comparative causation, in the terms of the court in Hopkins, involves the comparison
by the jury of the percentage of producing cause of the product defect as balanced
against the proximate causes of the plaintiff and third parties, with a total between all
1038 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
in the dissent in a California case,1"9 courts that use compara-
tive principles in strict liability actions may be mixing "negli-
gence apples" with "liability-without-fault oranges."" That
is, courts may be forcing comparison of incompatible princi-
causes of one hundred percent. See discussion in Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 351. See also
discussions supra text accompanying notes 44-55, 99-106. Such a shift to comparative
causation is arguably more consistent with the theoretical and conceptual require-
ments of fairness in loss distribution in that no connotations of blameworthiness need
enter into jury consideration. Murray, 610 F.2d at 159. Some courts, such as those in
Butaud, 555 P.2d at 45 and Daly, 575 P.2d at 1168, have attempted to characterize the
doctrinal difficulties as inconsequential. Indeed, as the California court in Daly stated,
"Fixed semantic consistency at this point is less important than the attainment of a just
and equitable result." 575 P.2d at 1168 (emphasis added). The court in Dal set forth a
broad, general rule in the face of a relatively narrow set of facts. The court established
few guidelines, with little precision for use by trial courts, stating:
The interweaving of concept and terminology in this area suggests a ju-
dicial posture that is flexible rather than doctrinaire.
We pause at this point to observe that where, as here, a consumer or
user sues the manufacturer or designer alone, technically, neither fault
nor conduct is really compared functionally. The conduct of one party
in combination with the product of another, or perhaps the placing of a
defective article in the stream of projected and anticipated use, may pro-
duce the ultimate injury. In such a case as in the situation before us, we
think the term "equitable apportionment or allocation of loss" may be
more descriptive than "comparative fault."
Id. While "semantic consistency" may not be the paramount concern in tort law, "se-
mantic consistency" in comparative loss allocation, by distributing loss according to
causation, leads to "judgment consistency" as well. Murray, 610 F.2d at 159. By a shift
to causative contribution rather than to comparative fault the semantic difficulties are
bridged and the practical difficulties overcome. Id See also Twerski, supra this note;
Wade, supra note 26. The court in Murray elaborated on the theory as follows:
In apportioning damages we are really asking how much the injury was
caused by the defect in the product versus how much was caused by the
plaintiff's own actions. . . . Thus, the underlying task in each case is to
analyze and compare the causal conduct of each party regardless of its
label [of negligence or strict liability].
610 F.2d at 159. Through causative contribution or comparative causation, the jury is
not forced to make the ad hoc "apples and oranges" comparisons of plaintiff or third
party fault and liability without fault. Cf Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products
Liability, 61 TEx. L. REV. 777 (1983). But see Twerski, supra this note; Wade, supra note
26; Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence. The Colh'sion of Fault and No-
Fault, 14 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 327 (1977). Instead, the jury may avoid the distractions
of irrelevant testimony going to the distributor's fault in distributing the product and
concentrate on the fair and equitable distribution of damages as among parties. Mur-
ray, 610 F.2d at 159-61. See also Twerski, supra this note; Wade, supra note 26; Levine,
supra this note; Powers, supra this note.
- Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d at 757-64, 575 P.2d at 1181-86, 144
Cal. Rptr. at 399-404 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
I Id.
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pies.111 In an effort, however, to distribute more equitably
the loss which may have resulted, at least in part, from the
misconduct of the plaintiff, many courts have bridged the
conceptual gap with a number of doctrinal devices. "2
Some states without comparative negligence statutes have
judicially adopted comparative responsibility in strict prod-
ucts liability actions as a natural progression from judicial
adoption of section 402A strict liability and comparative neg-
.. 20 Cal. 3d at 763-64, 575 P.2d at 1185-86, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04. The dissent
carries the blending of apples and oranges by the majority to the absurd:
The majority devote considerable effort to rationalizing what has been
described as a mixture of apples and oranges. Their point might be per-
suasive if there were some authority recognizing a defense of contribu-
tory products liability, for which they are now substituting comparative
products liability. However, all research to discover such apples and or-
anges has been fruitless. The conclusion is inescapable that the majority,
in avoiding approval of comparative negligence in name as a defense to
products liability, are thereby originating a new defense that can only be
described as comparative products liability. We may now anticipate
similar defenses in the vast number of other tort actions. Can compara-
tive libel, comparative slander of title, comparative wrongful litigation,
comparative nuisance, comparative fraud, be far behind? By whatever
name, negligence, theretofore just one subtopic in the elaborate spec-
trum of torts- which require six volumes and appendices of the Restate-
ment Second of Torts to cover-now seems destined to envelop the
entire tort field.
20 Cal. 3d at 760-61, 575 P.2d at 1184, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 402. But see Powers, supra note
108, at 803:
Comparing the fault of a plaintiff or negligent defendant with the "cul-
pability" of a strictly liable defendant seems as impossible as a compari-
son of apples and oranges. Opponents of comparative allocation in
products liability have argued that juries asked to make such a compari-
son will assign percentages to each party, but they will assign percent-
ages to each party, but they will do so either arbitrarily or by making a
sub rosa appraisal of the defendant's fault. These responses would render
comparative allocation of loss either arbitrary or incompatible with the
nonfault basis of strict products liability. This argument is powerful as a
pragmatic flag of caution, but it does not demonstrate an intrinsic in-
compatibility of comparative allocation and strict products liability. We
routinely compare apples and oranges by using one of two methods.
One method of comparison focuses on a shared feature, such as weight,
volume, juice content, or calories. The other method refers to an over-
reaching value system, such as price or preference, which incorporates
subordinate values that appear at first glance to be incommensurate.
Similar methods could be used to compare fault with the "culpability"
of a strict products liability defendant.
Id. (citations omitted).
12 See infia notes 113-141 and accompanying text.
1040 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
ligence." 3 Such was the case in Daly v. General Motors Corp.' "
4
In Daly, the decedent was driving an Opel automobile when
it collided with, and spun off of, a metal divider fence." 5 The
driver's-side door was thrown open, and the driver was forci-
bly ejected and killed." 6 The plaintiffs alleged that the dece-
dent's fatal injuries were produced by his ejection from the
car and that such ejection would not have occurred but for
the activation on impact of a defective door latch." 7 As the
court stated, "[Being] persuaded by logic, justice, and funda-
mental fairness, we conclude that a system of comparative
fault should be . . . extended to actions founded on strict
products liability.""' 8 The court in Daly went further to dis-
miss claims of conceptual inconsistency through the reason-
ing of the Supreme Court of Alaska." 9 The Alaskan court
had reasoned that the difficulty in balancing fault principles
with strict liability was "more apparent than real."'' 20  The
Daly court summarized its position in light of that reasoning
by stating that "[w]hile fully recognizing the theoretical and
semantic distinction between the twin principles of strict
products liability and traditional negligence, we think they
can be blended or accommodated."' ' 2'
11:1 See Pan-Alaska Fisheries v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.
1977) (suit in admiralty adopting comparative fault applied as comparative causation);
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976) (adopting
comparative fault as comparative causation); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.
3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (adopting comparison charactenezdas
"equitable apportionment" or "allocation of loss," but named "comparative fault");
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (defining comparative ap-
portionment in terms of "comparative negligence").
20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 730, 575 P.2d at 1164, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
Id
" 7 Id
- Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
,,9 Id (citing Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42, 45
(Alaska 1976)).
- Butaud, 555 P.2d at 45.
,2, Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 734, 575 P.2d at 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385. The court went
further in its clarification of the theoretical and semantic problems to state that since
"neither fault nor conduct is really compared functionally . . . we think the term 'eq-
uitable apportionment' or 'allocation of loss' may be more descriptive than 'compara-
tive fault'." 20 Cal. 3d at 736, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
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In states that have comparative negligence statutes,"'
other means of theoretical reconciliation are utilized. One
approach is to analogize strict liability to negligence per se as
developed in the Wisconsin case of Dippel v. Sci'ano.12 3 In that
case, Donald Dippel sued to recover for injuries sustained
when a tavern owner's coin-operated pool table collapsed
upon his foot and crushed it.' 24 Dippel alleged a warranty
claim and a negligence claim against the tavern owner and
the seller of the table. 25 The trial court sustained a demurrer
against the plaintiffs because of lack of privity, but on appeal
the Supreme Court of Wiscosin ruled first, that an action lay
in strict products liability, and second, in dicta, that the
state's comparative negligence statute applied to actions
brought on a strict products theory.126 As stated by the court
in Dippd, "liability imposed [in an action under strict liabil-
ity] is . . .akin to negligence per se.' 27 The court continued,
stating that as " '[i]n all those cases where it is said that [in]
the performance of the wrongful act .. . the defendant is
guilty as a matter of law or that the act is negligent per se, the
[strict products liability] case is one which admits of no ques-
tion as to reasonable anticipation or foreseeability,' " and is,
therefore, similar to a case of negligence per se.128 Thus, the
court reasoned, since Wisconsin allowed comparison of fault
through its comparative negligence statute in cases of ordi-
nary negligence per se,'129 when the "negligence per se" of strict
liability is a producing cause 30 of a damaging event, it may
also be compared to the contributory negligence of the
. For a listing of states with comparative negligence statutes, see Brewster, Compara-
tive Neghgence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 107, 107 n.2 (1976). See also
discussion of theoretical difficulties, supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
IT, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
155 N.W.2d at 56.
'5 Id
Id. at 65.
,-7 Id. at 64. "Negligence per se" is conduct which is negligent as a matter of law.
,1 Di ppel, 155 N.W.2d at 64 (quoting Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 240,
234 N.W. 372, 378 (1931)).
-, Dippel, 155 N.W.2d at 64. The Dippel court stated that "[c]omparison of the
failure to exercise ordinary care and negligence per se is so common and widely ap-
proved in our jurisdiction as to need no citation." Id
':,' See definition of producing cause, supra note 34.
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plaintiff. 3'
The second approach to the application of statutory com-
parative fault to strict liability actions, as explained by the
court in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &Machzine Co.,1 32 is to treat
"the term 'negligence' [as being] subsumed within the con-
cept of tortious fault."' 33 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
reasoned that the concept of strict liability has within it an
inherent notion of fault. 134 In Suter, a sheet metal worker
brought suit on a strict products theory against the manufac-
turer of an industrial sheet metal rolling machine after his
hand became caught in the device, causing injuries.'35 Upon
jury findings that Suter himself was guilty of negligence, the
trial court rendered judgment for one-half of his damages as
assessed by the jury. 136 The New Jersey Superior Court, Ap-
pellate Division, modified the judgment and awarded the
plaintiff the full amount of the jury assessment.137  The
Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed, but added in dicta
that the state's comparative negligence statute applied to
strict liability actions. 138 The court stated that "[t]he manu-
facturer or supplier of a chattel has been charged with the
duty of distributing a product which is fit, suitable and duly
safe. Failure to comply with this standard constitutes
fault." M39 Thus, since the notion of fault is common between
l:, Dippel, 155 N.W.2d at 64. Minnesota has adopted the reasoning of the Dzppel
decision. See, e.g., Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393 (Minn. 1977)
(holding that "our adoption of the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute pre-
sumed our adoption of. .. the Wisconsin rule that the comparative negligence statute
applies in actions brought on a § 402A theory").
,:,, 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
,x. Id at 145.




ma Id at 147.
,:w Id. at 146. The court quoted W. PROSSER, supra note 26, § 75 at 493:
There is a broader sense in which "fault" means nothing more than a
departure from a standard of conduct required of a man by society for
the protection of his neighbors; and if the departure is an innocent one,
and the defendant cannot help it, it is none the less a departure, and a
social wrong. The distinction still remains between the man who has
deviated from the standard, and the man who has not. The defendant
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an action for strict liability and a defense of contributory neg-.
ligence, 40 the application of the comparative negligence stat-
ute is deemed proper. 
4 1
Other courts have refused to apply their jurisdictions' com-
parative negligence statutes to actions in strict liability 42 but
have nonetheless adopted some form of comparative responsi-
bility. 4 3 Such was the result in the New Hampshire Supreme
Court case of Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. ' 44 In Thibault,
the plaintiff fell while using a lawn mower manufactured by
the defendant, Sears,1 45 and seriously injured himself when
his foot slid under the housing and into the blades. 4 6 The
plaintiff sued on a theory of strict products liability, alleging
that the mower should have had a rear trailing guard to pre-
vent such accidents. 47 At trial, the jury returned a verdict
for the defendant, and the trial judge entered judgment. 4
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed,
but added in dicta that it "judicially recognize[d] the com-
parative concept in strict liability cases parallel to the legisla-
ture's recognition of it in the area of negligence. "'49  In
may not be to blame for being out of line with what society requires of
him, but he is none the less out of line.
Id
I 406 A.2d at 146-47.
,, Id A line of other cases has adopted similar reasoning. See e.g., Sun Valley Air-
lines v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976) (the court holding
that "the manufacturer is under a duty to produce a product which is free from unrea-
sonably dangerous conditions. A violation of that duty constitutes blameworthiness or
culpability or a sense of legal fault"); Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618
P.2d 788 (1980) ("liability for damages resulting from putting a dangerously defective
product in commercial channels").
"I See, e.g., Stueve v. American Honda Motors, 457 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1978);
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978) (discussed infra
text accompanying notes 144-156); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353
(Okla. 1974). Cf General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855.
1- See, e.g., Stueve v. American Honda Motors, 457 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1978);
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Kirkland v.
General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). See also Hopkits, 548 S.W.2d 344
(Tex. 1977).
"1 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978).




'14 Id at 850.
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reasoning that "the comparative negligence statute . . . does
not apply to strict liability cases because it is confined by its
terms to actions for negligence,"'5 ° the New Hampshire court
joined with others in deciding not to tamper with a specific
legislative enactment.15" ' Nonetheless, it judicially adopted a
system of comparative principles. 5 2 Still, those same courts
have often mitigated their pronouncement of statutory inap-
plicability and adopted judicial comparative fault schemes.'53
These courts have reasoned that since the legislature enacted
comparison in negligence cases, the next logical step was judi-
cial adoption of comparative responsibility 5 4 - especially
along lines of comparative causation"' - in strict liability
cases to achieve fair loss allocation and permit semantic
continuity.'56
Thus, it is clear that a number of states have moved, either
judicially or statutorily, toward comparative responsibility in
strict liability. It has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions
precisely because it helps further the legitimate ends of accu-
rate loss distribution and product safety. Equally important,
comparative systems of loss allocation distribute to the plain-
tiff that which is his fault; in those states having adopted
some form of comparative allocation, the manufacturer and
o Id at 848.
Id See, e.g., Sznmons, 558 S.W.2d 855; Kirkland v. General Motors, 521 P.2d 1353
(Okla. 1974).
395 A.2d at 850.
See, e.g., Murray, 610 F.2d 149 (applying Virgin Islands' law, comparative negli-
gence statute held inapplicable, but comparative causation allowed to promote fair loss
allocation and to permit semantic continuity); Stueve v. American Honda Motors, 457
F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1978) (applying Kansas law, common law of comparative fault
without the application of the comparative negligence statute).
4 Murray, 610 F.2d at 162. The court stated:
[This] leads us to conclude that a system of comparative fault may effec-
tively operate in strict products liability cases and will result in a more
equitable apportionment of the loss for product related injuries while
furthering the valid policy goals behind the strict products liability
action.
Id
Id The analysis works as follows and is parallel to that described in Hopkins, 548
S.W.2d 344, for misuse cases: if fault on the part of'the plaintiff is present in addition to
misuse, the trier of fact shall reduce the damage award in proportion to the plaintiff's
causal contribution to his own injury. Id See also supra text accompanying notes 44-55.
Murray, 610 F.2d at 162.
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the purchasing public need no longer pay for the plaintiff's
negligence. Such a pathway is neither inconsistent with the
policies underlying the strict products liability cause of ac-
tion, nor is it an improper means of loss allocation. 157
II. ANALYSIS OF DUNCAN V CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY
The Supreme Court of Texas in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft
Co. 1' addressed three separate issues.' 59 The first issue of
concern was whether the release executed by Mrs. Duncan in
favor of Air Plains West, Inc. and the Smithson estate was to
be governed by Texas or New Mexico law;' 6° the court re-
solved the choice of law question by affirming the court of
appeals' decision 6' and found that Texas had the most signif-
icant relationship to the case.' 62 The second issue addressed
by the court in Duncan was whether the release executed by
Mrs. Duncan pursuant to her settlement with Air Plains West
and the Smithson estate was effective to release Cessna on the
basis of its generalized language. 163 The court resolved this
issue by holding that "[a] tortfeasor can claim the protection
of a release only if the release refers to him by name or with
such descriptive particularity that his identity or his connec-
tion with the tortious event is not in doubt."' 64
But the third and most significant issue arose over whether
Cessna was entitled to contribution from Smithson's estate
because Smithson was contributorily negligent in his piloting
of the airplane. 65 The court observed that the issue of contri-
157 Id.
665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
Id at 213-26.
Id at 214-15.
Id at 214. Significantly, the court affirmed the court of appeals result (that Texas
law was applicable to the case), but on a different basis; overruling the court of appeals
use of lex loci principles, the Supreme Court of Texas adopted the choice of law the
"most significant relationship" choice of law methodology for subsequent contract
cases as espoused for tort cases in Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971).
-2 Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421 ("[T]he lex loci rules will no longer be used to resolve
conflicts problems.").
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bution spawned two secondary questions:
[First,] whether a plaintiffs contributory negligence is a de-
fense in strict products liability actions when the negligence
does not rise to the level of assumed risk or unforeseeable
product misuse, but is more than a mere failure to discover a
product defect; and [second,] whether comparative contribu-
tion among tortfeasors is possible when at least one is strictly
liable. 166
In response to the third issue's sub-questions the court ex-
tensively analyzed Texas and other state and federal law. Af-
ter first discussing the adoption of section 402A as the law in
Texas,"' with its prohibition of contributory negligence as a
defense under comment "n",16 the court concluded under
the reasoning of Hopkins1 69 that "a manufacturer is not an
insuror '"'7 and is not to be held liable for that portion of
damages caused by the misuse of the product user.'71 The
court further articulated that under existing law, only two
defenses to strict liabilty were available: "the absolute defense
of assumption of the risk, and the comparative defense of un-
foreseeable product misuse. "172 Noting, however, that in a
multi-theory products case such defenses spawn numerous
procedural difficulties, 173 the court questioned the very theo-
167 Id See McKisson, 416 S.W.2d 787; Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779.
- Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 422. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A,
comment n, which states:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negli-
gence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in a product or
guard against its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory
negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to
encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of
assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of
strict liability.
Id See also, Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975); Henderson v. Ford
Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1974) (stating: "Assumption of risk is the defense;
contributory negligence or failure to act reasonably is not").
- General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
17o Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 423 (citing Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344).
17, Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 423.
172 Id
-, Id The court stated:
In Texas, a plaintiff can predicate a product liability action on one or
more of three theories of recovery: (1) strict liability under section 402A,
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retical and practical justification of the defenses.' 7 4 Stating
that each defense is little more than an "extreme variant" of
contributory negligence,'7 5 the court reiterated its concern
over the state of Texas products liabilty law as expressed in
SI'mmons 17 6 and other decisions. 177
The Duncan court then recited the difficulties that Texas
courts have encountered due to the inapplicability of article
2212a in the apportionment of joint liability among negligent
and strictly liable tortfeasors. 178 The court explained that ar-
ticle 2212a provides for comparative contribution in negli-
gence cases and that article 2212 provides for pro rata
contribution in other tort actions.17' The court stated, how-
ever, that no mechanism existed "to fairly and sensibly com-
pare causation in [mixed causes of action]."' 8 Repeating its
admonition, as found in Simmons, that article 2212a is not ap-
plicable to cases in strict liability,' 8 ' the court also reasserted
its holding in Simmons that the legislature had not given
Texas courts, through either article 2212 or article 2212a, a
means for apportionment of causation among negligent and
strictly-liable joint tortfeasors.'8 2
In response to the difficulties it recognized, the court began
(2) breach of warranty under the U.C.C., and (3) negligence. If either
breach of warranty or negligence is alleged in addition to strict liability,
the product supplier is entitled to submit three defensive issues, namely,
contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and misuse. In addition,
he may also be entitled to submission of both a comparative negligence




17,i 558 S.W.2d 855. See supra text accompanying notes 84-98.
,,7 Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 423-24 (citing Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609
S.W.2d 743, 750-51 (Tex. 1980) (Pope, J. concurring); Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529
S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975)).
0o Duncan, 655 S.W.2d at 423-24. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a
(Vernon Supp. 1983), supra note 72.
179 Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 423 (citing Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855). See TEX. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art 2212 (Vernon 1972), supra note 87.
,,, Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 424. See also Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855; Bell Helicopter v.
Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 424.
Id. See Simmons, 558 S.W.2d at 855.
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an analysis of alternatives. 1 3 Noting that numerous com-
mentators have "strenuously urged the implementation of
comparative fault, also referred to as comparative responsi-
bility or comparative causation, as a means of distributing
accident costs among negligent plaintiffs, negligent defend-
ants, and strictly liable defendants," 18 4 the court restated the
unfairness of the all-or-nothing defenses to strict liability, and
the unfairness and the virtual absolute liability that often in-
heres on the product supplier.185 Additionally, the court as-
serted that the inefficiencies of the present liability allocation
system virtually nullified equitable and rational risk distribu-
tion by overburdening the manufacturer/distributor.186
Thus, the court stated, a shift to comparative responsibility
was required to alleviate that burden in cases involving mis-
conduct by the plaintiff or a third party. 8 7 The court con-
cluded its theoretical analysis by stating that "applying
principles of comparative apportionment to strict liability not
only furthers the policy goals of section 402A but simplifies
the submission of product cases."' 18 8
The Supreme Court of Texas then reviewed the various ap-
proaches to the adoption of comparative apportionment." 9
Focusing first upon the California Supreme Court's judicial
adoption of comparative fault in Daly, '9 whereby that court
supplemented California's rules on strict liability, the Texas
court favorably recited California's policy decisions on com-
parative fault.' 9 ' In addition, and for the same policy rea-
sons, the court cited with some approval Wisconsin's
Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 414-34.
Id at 424. The court favorably cited Edgar, Products Liability in Texas, 11 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 23, 44-50 (1979); Sales, supra note 56, at 363-65; Special Project- Texas
Tort Law in Transition, 57 TEX. L. REV. 381, 491-95 (1979); Schwartz, Strict Liability and
Contributory Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171, 178-81 (1974); Wade, supra note 26, at
376-81.
- Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 414. See Sales, supra note 27, at 776-78.
- Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 424-25.
I"7 Id
, Id. at 425.
89 Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 425.
See Daly, 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380. See supra text accom-
panying notes 113-121.
19, Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 425.
CASENO TES AND STA TUTE NOTES
adoption of the doctrine of strict liability as negligence per
se.19 2  Similarly, the court acknowledged the New Jersey
Supreme Court's pronouncement that the placement of a de-
fective product into the stream of commerce is a species of
fault and therefore comparable with negligence.193 The
Texas court chose, however, the judicially adopted compara-
tive apportionment system espoused by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court.194
In citing Thbaul/'95 and reaffirming the notion that be-
cause article 2212a is couched in terms of "negligence" it has
no applicability to strict liability actions in tort, 196 the court
asserted the common law adoption of a comparative appor-
tionment system.' 97 Article 2212, the court said, does not
foreclose such a judicial adoption and in fact provides for
common law exceptions to the applicability of pro rata contri-
bution. 98 Indeed, the court stressed that in 1917 when article
2212 was enacted, no identifiable body of strict products lia-
bility law existed. 99 Thus, it is unlikely that the statute was
intended to control theretofore unforeseen theories.20 0  The
court concluded, therefore, that article 2212 and the court's
reasoning in Simmons were insufficient barriers to judicial
adoption of comparative apportionment.2°1 Consequently,
the court followed the Thibaull court's lead and judically
adopted a compartive apportionment system.20 2
The Supreme Court of Texas in Duncan, however, labeled
its system of loss allocation "comparative causation" rather
192 Id See Dippel, 155 N.W.2d 55. See supra notes 122-131 and accompanying text.
, Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 415. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81
N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979). See also supra text accompanying notes 133-141.
'- Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 416. See Thbault, 395 A.2d 843. See also supra text accom-
panying notes 144-156.
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978).
Duncan, 665 S.W.2d 855. See also Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855.
Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 427.
Id at 427. See also article 2212, supra note 87. The court held that to the extent
that it is inconsistent with the rejection of article 2212 and applicable to strict products
liability cases, Simmons is overruled. Id
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than "comparative fault. ' 20 3 Basing its choice upon the more
conceptually accurate expression of causation as the entity to
be compared,0 4 the court noted that "the defendant's 'fault,'
in the traditional sense of culpability, is not at issue. ' 20 5 Thus,
the court said, the trier of fact is not comparing the fault or
conduct of the products defendant to that of the plaintiff or
other defendants.20 6 Rather, "[t]he trier of fact is to compare
the harm caused by the defective product with the harm
caused by the negligence of other defendants, any settling
tortfeasors and the plaintiff. '20 7 The court noted that such a
system was, in fact, consistent with its focus on causation in
earlier cases, 208 and that
Plaintiffs will continue to be relieved of proving that the man-
ufacturer or distributor was negligent in the production, de-
sign, or dissemination of the article in question. Defendant's
liability for injuries caused by a defective product remains
strict.
20 9
Thus, the court said, in addition to establishing a new system
213 Id at 427. But see Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 507, 515
(July 13, 1983) (opinion withdrawn) (where the court referred to that which was to be
compared as "fault').
- See supra notes 108-111.
2or. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 427.
- Id
-7 Id. The court suggested in a footnote special issues on comparative causation:
We suggest that the following general form, adapted to the specific alle-
gations of each case, provides a general idea of the submission of the
comparative apportionment issue in these cases:
If, in answer to Questions-,-, and -, you have found that more than
one party's act(s) or product(s) contributed to cause the plaintiff's inju-
ries, and only in that event, then answer the following question.






Cf Daly, 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1980) (sug-
gesting analogous special issues from maritime seaworthiness cases). 575
P.2d at 1170.
Zd
Id. (citing Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products, 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.
1978), and Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344)).
- Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 418 (citing Daly, 575 P.2d at 1168).
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of loss allocation, the court preserved all of the policies sup-
porting strict products liability.2"'
In addition, the court abolished the separate defenses of
assumption of the risk and misuse, and overruled Henderson
and Hopkins to the extent that they are inconsistent with
Duncan.21 ' The court subsumed the defenses within the no-
tion of contributory negligence and drew all strict products
liability cases not controlled by article 2212a within the
Duncan holding.21 2 The court's disposition of the defenses and
the adoption of comparative causation, the court said, "is es-
pecially appropriate in crashworthiness cases where the prod-
uct defect causes or enhances injuries but does not cause the
accident. 2 1 3 The court explained that in cases where a com-
bination of factors causes the injury and where the degree of
harm is increased by the product defect, the new system per-
mits jury allocation of loss according to responsibility for it.2 4
After adopting its system of comparative causation the
court addressed two significant side issues:2 5 first, the choice
of pure comparison over modified comparison with the ac-
companying adoption of full joint and several liability,21 6 and
second, the effect of partial settlements. 21 7 In deciding to
adopt a pure comparative scheme, the court recited "the rela-
tive inefficiency and reduced deterrent effect [(as to product
2,o Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 428.
v IdR
12 Id. at 429. The court clarified, stating,
Article 2212a will, of course, continue to govern cases in which the plain-
tiff alleges only negligence or where the plaintiff fails to obtain findings
of defect and producing cause, or breach of warranty, against a product
supplier who has been joined with a negligent defendant.
Id.
Id. at 428.
21 Id. (citing Stueve v. American Honda Motor, 457 F. Supp. 740, 559-60 (D. Kan.
1978)); see also Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1978) (comparing
causation in automobile crashworthiness case); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Air-
craft, 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1098-99 (D. Mont. 1981) (comparing fault in airplane
crashworthiness case); Daoy, 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (com-
paring fault in automobile crashworthiness case).
2 Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 428-32.
2'" See tfra notes 218-226 and accompanying text. See supra note 79.
2,1 See infta notes 227-244 and accompanying text.
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manufacturers)] of modified comparative apportionment. '218
The court refused to engraft the "51-percent-bar" rule of arti-
cle 2212a, wherein the plaintiff found to be 51 percent or
greater at fault is barred from recovery.2 9  The court ex-
plained that "[n]o sound reason exists for allowing a defend-
ant to escape liability which the jury has allocated to him,
irrespective of the responsibility allocated to the plaintiff.
220
Thus, the court held that a plaintiff may recover any percent-
age of damages caused by the defendants regardless of the
percentage of causation attributable to them.221
The court also held that each defendant found to be a
cause of the plaintiffs injuries under a strict products liability
theory is to be held jointly and severally liable for the entire
amount of damages the plaintiff is entitled to recover.2 2 Fur-
ther, however, each defendant is entitled to contribution from
the other defendants for amounts paid in excess of his per-
centage share.223 In so holding, the court expressly rejected
the limitation on joint and several liability contained within
article 2212a.224 The adoption of full joint and several liabil-
ity protects plaintiffs when one or more defendants is insol-
vent and ostensibly furthers the goal of loss allocation: the
injured are to be adequately compensated. 225 The court justi-
fied such a policy on the theory that "the defendants' conduct
or products endangered another person, the plaintiff, while
the plaintiff's conduct only endangered himself."'226
.... Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 418 (citing V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
§§ 12.6, 12.7 at 207, 209; Prosser, Comparative Neghgence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 494
(1953)).
-, Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 429. See also article 2212a, supra note 72.
120 Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 429 (citing Murray, 610 F.2d at 162).
2 Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 429.
2 Id. "A liability is said to be joint and several when the creditor may sue one or
more of the parties to such liability separately, or all of them together at his option."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Several liability is that which is
"separate and distinct from liability of another to the extent that an independent ac-
tion may be brought without joinder of others." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (rev.
5th ed. 1979).
a: Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 429.
a, Id See also article 2212a § 2(c), supra note 72.
2- Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 429.
2'i Id (citing American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578,
578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978)). The court, in adopting full joint and several
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In response to the issue of the effects of partial settlements
liability, promotes the policy considerations behind strict products liability. See supra
note 27. See also W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 at 13 (1979). In
addition, the court adopts the position on joint and several liability held by the vast
majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue. See Petitioner's Motion to Re-
form Opinion, Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 507, at 10, 11 (here-
inafter "Motion to Reform") (discussing the approaches taken in several states). State
and Federal decisions on the law that were included were Da'y, 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575
P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (stating "[The manufacturer's] exposure will be lessened
only to the extent that the trier of fact finds that the victim's conduct contributed to his
injury."); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska
1976) (stating: "The manufacturer is still accountable for all the harm from a defective
product except that part caused by the consumer's own conduct."); Pan-Alaska Fisher-
ies, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1139 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating:
"[T]he defendant is strictly liable for the harm caused from his defective product, ex-
cept that the award of damages shall be reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's contri-
bution to his own loss or injury.") See also Murray, 610 F.2d at 162; Conkright v.
Ballantyne of Omaha, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (maintaining joint
and several liability); American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d
578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) (stating: "joint and several liability does
not logically conflict with a comparative negligence regime"); Thibault v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, -, 395 A.2d 843, 850 (1978) (stating: "In multiple defend-
ant cases, if recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, the jury shall
apportion the loss in ratio to what each liable defendant caused or contributed to the
loss or injury to the amount of causation or liability attributed to all defendants
against whom recovery is allowed."). See in support of the majority view A. MURPHY,
K. SANTAGATA & F. GRAD, THE LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY, PROBLEMS AND POLI-
CIES 67-69 (1982); Motion to Reform, supra this note, at 1-12. Petitioner put forth an
example:
An example of this court's holding in application to a typical
crashworthiness situation will illustrate the harshness and unfairness of
the retreat from joint and several liability which this court has errone-
ously embraced [in its opinion of July 13, 19831. In a typical rear-end
low speed accident involving a Ford Pinto that bursts into flame as a
result of a gas tank rupture, the jury could likely find 10% fault on the
plaintiff for stopping too quickly, 9% "fault" or "causation" on the part
of the manufacturer of the defectively designed gas tank and 81% on the
part of the defendant who rear-ended the plaintiff. The latter defendant
may well have only a $10,000.00 minimum limit insurance policy or be
completely insolvent. Under this Court's opinion and holding of July
13, the manufacturer will be responsible for only 9% of the plaintiff's
damages despite the fact that the plaintiff's own conduct contributed
only 10% to his own loss.
Id. Contra Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equipment, 437 F. Supp. 707 (D. Kan.
1977) (interpreting Kansas statutory law); Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867
(1978)). See BOWMAN, Contribution, Joit Liabh'ty and Settlement Under Comparative Fault
from the Defendant's Vewpoint, SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY PRODUCTS LIABIL-
ITY INSTITUTE § 12.01 (1983). Bowman stated:
In states where joint and several liability exists, manufacturers found to
be responsible for only tiny shares of causal fault may find themselves
paying plaintiff's full judgment in the event that co-defendants are judg-
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on cases to be governed by Duncan, the court held that "in
multiple defendant cases in which grounds of recovery other
than negligence are established, the non-settling defendants'
liability and the plaintiffs recovery shall be reduced by the per-
cent share of causation assigned to the settling tortfeasor by the
trier of fact." '227 Prior to the Duncan drcision, in actions
governed by article 2212, a defendant could proceed to trial
seeking a pro rata or proportionate reduction 22' but advanta-
geously elect 229 a pro tanto or dollar-for-dollar credit for any
settlement accepted by the plaintiff from another defend-
ant.2 3  This ability of the defendant to adjust his liability
based upon the jury findings was examined carefully by the
court and rejected.23'
The court addressed several reasons for its holding that a
percentage credit is proper in lieu of either pro rata or pro tanto
reduction.232 First, the pro rata method arbitrarily reduces the
defendant's liability by the number of settling tortfeasors di-
ment-proof, immune or cannot be located. Thus, extreme unfairness ob-
tains in holding a nearly faultless manufacturer responsible to pay all of
the fault attributable to non-joined or judgment-proof co-defendants.
The opportunity to allocate fairly causal fault among co-defendants,
encourages the joinder of numerous co-defendants any one of which may
be held to be partly responsible. With a increased stable of co-defend-
ants, the quantity of warfare is increased, and so are the verdicts.
Id
d7 Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 429. (emphasis added).
" Id A pro rata credit, as defined and permitted by Palestine Contractors V. Perkins, 386
S.W.2d 764 ('Tex. 1964), is a proportional credit. See BOWMAN, supra note 226, at
§ 12.02. The proportional set-off is referred to in other jurisdictions as "equitable in-
demnity." See also Gomes v. Broadhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967); Pierringer v.
Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963); Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.
143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
2- Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 430. Deal, 576 S.W.2d at 416 (stating that "after the
verdict had settled questions of fault and amount of damages, the court would apply
whichever rule was [most advantagious to defendant]". In ordinary negligence suits
after the adoption of article 2212a, however, the election must be made prior to the
submission of the case to the jury to avoid giving the defendant a "best-of-both-worlds"
result). See Cypress Creek v. Muller, 640 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1982).
2:, Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 430. A pro tanto credit for amounts paid in settlement is a
"dollar-for-dollar" credit. See Bradshaw v. Baylor University, 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d
703 (1924).
2, Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 430-32.
2:1 Id at 430.
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vided by the total number of tortfeasors;2 33 thus, the pro rata
credit places a risk of accepting an inadequate settlement
upon the plaintiff. 34 The court dismissed the pro rata system
as "crude headcounting" in light of the newly adopted system
of comparative allocation.2 35  Further, the court criticized
any use of pro tanto reduction by a defendant because the dol-
lar-for-dollar reduction in liability would be attributable to a
settlement to which he is not a party.2 36 The fluctuation in
the defendant's liability, the court said, "cannot be reconciled
with the policy of apportioning liability in relation to each
party's responsibility .... *237 Thus, the court adopted a
system to reduce the liability of non-settling defendants by
that percentage of causation allocated by the fact finder to
the settling defendant.
238
The adoption of a percent credit, the court said, necessi-
tates the abrogation of the long-held rule that a plaintiff may
recover but one satisfaction of his damages.239 Indeed, a
plaintiff may recover more than one satisfaction, but he stands
the same chance that he might recover less.240 As the court
stated, "Plaintiffs bear the risk of poor settlements; logic and
equity dictate that the benefit of good settlements should also
be theirs." 241' The court reasoned that the settlement has no
effect on any liability that may rest with a non-settling de-
fendant.242 Thus, there is no "unjust enrichment" argument
if the plaintiff recovers more than one satisfaction of his dam-
ages because no one is harmed. 43 Accordingly, the court








.... Id. (citing Bradshaw, 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703).
2, Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 430.
241 Id.
23 Id. The same arguments were applied to the cases governed by article 2212a in
Cypress Creek, 640 S.W.2d at 866-67.
'24 Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 432.
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In closing, the court reaffirmed the continuing viability of
strict products liability under section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts to ensure consumer protection.245 Further,
the court restated "the right of a retailer or other member of
the marketing chain to receive indemnity from the manufac-
turer of the defective product when the retailer or other
member of the marketing chain is merely a conduit for the
defective product and is not independently culpable. 246
Thus, the court maintained the essential features of strict
products liability that protect plaintiffs and individual
defendants.24 7
Although it adopted a new system of comparative alloca-
tion of causation,248 the court decided not to make the effect
of its ruling applicable to the case at hand because of Cessna's
failure to perfect a proper bill of exceptions as to apportion-
ment of liability. 249 Consequently, Cessna received no relief
from the new system of allocation, the decision was applied
prospectively, and the entire issue was rendered as dicta.25 °
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Texas' decision in Duncan v. Cessna
Aircraft Co.25' brings the Texas system of strict products liabil-
ity into line with the growing consensus of states.252 By
adopting comparative causation in strict products liability
cases in which plaintiffs or third parties contribute to the
harm along with the products defendant, the court has estab-
lished a coherent and conceptually sound system of loss allo-
cation. 253 The court's invocation of comparative contribution
concepts into the law of strict liability maintains the policy
that supports strict products liability,254 yet eases the burden
Id.
747 Id.
14. Id at 428.
2.. Id at 432-33.
-1, Id.
2n, 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
212 See supra notes 107-157 and accompanying text.
2':1 See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
254 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. See also Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 428,
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placed upon the manufacturer/distributor by reducing total
awards of damages by the amount of causation attributable
to the plaintiff and third parties. 255 Thus, absolute liability
no longer grips the products defendant as the plaintiff is ac-
countable for his share of the harm.25
6
And yet, as pointed out in the dissent by Chief Justice Pope
of the Supreme Court of Texas, a significant inequity is done
by the court. As stated by Pope, the rule in Texas tort law
had consistently been that a change in the law should apply
both to future cases and to those still in the judicial process.2 57
But in Duncan, Cessna was denied the benefit of this rule. As
the Chief Justice explained,
This case was pleaded and tried exclusively as a products lia-
bility case, and the majority says for the first time in Texas
that it should have been tried with comparison of plaintiffs
negligence and the defendant's product[s] liability fault.
Somehow, Cessna, the one who successfully made that con-
tention has lost its cause. It lost because it failed to do what it
was prevented [by the trial court] from doing. Cessna's only
mistake was that it was denied and could not use a trial
method that never [before] existed in Texas.2 58
The result in Duncan gives rise to a conclusion by Pope: the
majority opinion "accords an unequal treatment to plaintiffs
and defendants. ' 259 Although Cessna proved its contentions,
and the court adopted the change in the law, Cessna lost.2 60
Only recently, the dissent pointed out, a plaintiff was allowed
the advantage of a change in the law on appeal. 261 "The rule
announced by this case is a simple one to state[,]" Pope ex-
plained. "Under [precedent], the plaintiff prevails if he wins
where the court stated that "[p]laintiffs will continue to be relieved of proving that the
manufacturer or distributor was negligent in the production, design, or dissemination
of the article in question. Defendant's liability for injuries caused by a defective prod-
uct remains strict." Id
-2r, Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 437-38.
rw Id
15 Id. (citing Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. 1983)).
2- Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 437-38.
25 Id
2CO Id
26, Id (citing Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 254 (rex. 1983)).
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[on appeal]; under Duncan, the plaintiff prevails if he loses.
The defendant loses both ways. 26
2
Indeed, the cause of the products defendant in general has
been similarly affected by the court's most recent decision in
Duncan. The instant opinion analyzed in this Note is not the
first handed down by the Supreme Court of Texas in this
case.263 Rather, it is in many regards a response to extensive
briefing for rehearing on a variety of aspects of the first opin-
ion by the plaintiff/petitioner and amid curiae.264 The origi-
nal opinion in Duncan purported to establish comparative
fault in lieu of comparative causation,265 and a system of joint
and several liability in parallel with article 2212a,2 66 but left
unanswered a number of issues, including the issue of election
and credit. The instant opinion adopts pure comparative
causation, but interjects full joint and several liability267 and
abrogates the "one recovery rule" in favor of a percentage
credit for settlements. 2 6 The implications of this aspect of
the opinion in Duncan are potentially staggering to settlement
prospects where there is at least one negligent but insolvent
defendant. In such a case as that, through its grant of full
joint and several liability, the court potentially places the full
burden upon the products defendant. If a plaintiff should
settle with an insolvent but negligent defendant, then that
portion of causation of the plaintiff's damages is lost for the
amount-however minimal-that might be available from
an insolvent defendant. But if the negligent defendant is left
in the suit and any fraction of liability may be placed upon
the products defendant, then recovery against both may be
had against the products defendant alone. In terms of pre-
trial strategy, the plaintiff has no incentive to settle with the
insolvent defendant or with the products defendant for less
than the full amount of damages if there is a likelihood of
N22 Id
2,3 See 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 507 (July 13, 1983).
264 See, e.g., Motion to Reform, supra note 226.
Duncan, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 514-16.
I d. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
"' Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 428-29.
Id at 429. See also supra notes 227-244 and accompanying text.
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recovery against the products defendant. As a trial strategy,
the plaintiff need only prove a minimal amount of liability on
the part of the products defendant and may focus upon prov-
ing a maximum amount upon the negligent defendant with
the result that the products defendant becomes liable for the
full award. 69 Thus, the products defendant's edge, appar-
ently sharpened by comparative causation, is dulled by the
other aspects of Duncan.
Nonethless, the instant opinion is preferable to the original
opinion for a variety of reasons. First, had the court main-
tained comparative fault, a conceptual cloud would have re-
mained over the comparative allocative system. Instead, the
court withdrew all notions of blameworthiness from the strict
products liability loss allocation analysis through its adoption
of a causative contribution system. Second, the court ren-
dered in dicta the means of handling the multitude of practi-
cal problems that accompany the new system. Questions of
joint and several liability, 270 of the affects of partial settle-
ments, 27 ' and of when and how article 2212a will govern
27 2
219 The difficulty with the present state of the law as espoused by the Supreme Court
of Texas in Duncan may be seen in an example:
While traveling at night Driver runs out of gas and pulls his car to the
side of the freeway. Driver attempts to turn on his emergency flashers,
but the switch made by Manufacturer fails and the lights do not flash.
Defendant, somewhat intoxicated, and covered by only the legal mini-
mum of insurance, rams into the rear of Driver's automobile at 55 miles
per hour, maiming Driver. Driver does not settle with any of the defend-
ants. At trial, Driver is able to prove that the light switch was defective
and that Defendant was negligent. The jury returns a finding that
Driver caused 10 percent of his own harm, that the Manufacturer of the
light switch caused one percent of the harm through manufacturing a
defective light switch, and that the intoxicated Defendant caused 89 per-
cent of the harm.
Had Driver settled with Defendant he would only have received that
minimal amount of compensation in addition to the one percent of dam-
ages from the Manufacturer. Instead, by Driver's refusing to settle,
Manufacturer absorbs 90 percent of the damages despite a jury finding
that it caused only one percent.
While it may be argued that the risk of this type of scenario occurring will cause poten-
tially strictly-liable defendants to settle more quickly, it is clear that much of the
strictly-liable defendant's bargaining power is lost.
- Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 429-30. See supra notes 227-244 and accompanying text.
27 Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 429-30. See supra notes 227-244 and accompanying text.
271 Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 429. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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have been answered by the court. Further, the court explic-
itly reaffirmed the adoption of section 402A of the Restate-
ment and the strict products liability cause of action.273 The
substance of the Duncan decision by the Supreme Court of
Texas is, therefore, essentially an advancement in Texas law,
with an overall, if somewhat limited, effect of greater fairness
to both plaintiffs and defendants.
David F Brown
Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 432.
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